



Report

Europe's refugees and migrants

Hidden flows, tightened borders and spiralling costs

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September 2016



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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Gonzalo Fanjul and Richard Mallett for their comments on this report, and for their support of this work. We are most grateful to the contributions from the Department for International Development, Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Joffe Charitable Trust, who funded this material. We also thank the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for supporting the preliminary findings of this research. Nikki Lee, Jonathan Mazliah, George Richards, Amie Retallick, James Rush and Evelyn Smail provided invaluable copy-editing support. All associated graphics were designed by Sean Willmott and produced by Pia Dawson.

The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

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Acronyms

AMIF	Asylum Migration and Integration Fund
BMI	German Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EDF	European Development Fund
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
Eurostat	Statistical office of the European Union
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally displaced people
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Internal Security Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WB	World Bank

Executive summary

Migration and forced displacement are on top of the global political agenda. However, many countries are yet to engage in a pragmatic debate on how to address and manage refugee and migrant flows. The focus on containing and reducing migration at all costs – and in doing so, ignoring international commitments to protect refugees and migrants – has been characterised by a crisis of solidarity and politics, in Europe and beyond. Effective policy responses are urgently required, and yet the gap between what is needed and what can realistically be achieved seems wider than ever.

This report aims to make a concrete and positive contribution to this gap, by taking a closer look at recent data on refugee and migrant flows and the cost of the European policy response, beyond the media headlines.

First, we analyse the number of people arriving in Europe via both well-known, ‘overt’ routes (mainly by sea, across the Mediterranean) and far less understood, ‘covert’ routes. Second, we consider the direct financial costs incurred by European states in an attempt to reduce the number of people arriving in Europe, as well as the money spent in neighbouring regions to address the root causes of migration and displacement. We then analyse the support costs for asylum seekers and those granted protection by member states. Based on this analysis, this report concludes by making a number of recommendations about how Europe can better manage the movement of people to, and within, its borders.

Research findings

Refugee and migrant flows: while fewer people are arriving by sea, the proportion of covert refugees and migrants is on the increase.

Since 2012, Europe has experienced record numbers of refugees and migrants arriving in its territories: migration to Europe via the Mediterranean has increased threefold every year. However, since the EU–Turkey deal in early 2016, and other bilateral agreements, the situation has changed. **Now, it is predicted that as few as 330,000 refugees and migrants are likely to arrive in Europe via the Mediterranean this year. This is far from the 3 million arrivals expected this year, and less than the 1.1 million arrivals in 2015.**


This could suggest that the ‘crisis’ is over: but these registered, overt arrivals by sea are only part of the picture. While only 330,000 people are projected to arrive by sea, **the projected number of new asylum applications is still very high – likely to reach 890,000 by the end of the year.**¹ By comparison, in 2015, 1.1 million people arrived by sea and 1.7 million people applied for asylum. This large discrepancy between new arrivals and new asylum applications suggests that **there are many people whose journeys to Europe we know little about.** These refugees and migrants travel to Europe through a variety of ‘covert’ channels and means: some over land concealed in vehicles; others by plane with false documents or by overstaying visas. Our analysis shows that only one-third are from Syria, with the majority coming from middle-income countries. As a share of asylum applications, covert arrivals are increasing. Figure i shows that, in 2015, only 35% of new asylum applications were from people arriving in Europe by covert means. In 2016, that proportion is projected to increase to approximately 60%.

While effective individual national border controls have reduced the number of new, overt, arrivals, they have not stopped the large movement of people to Europe. Over time, routes change and new ones open up; the closing of specific borders simply diverts refugees and migrants to neighbouring countries, or to more dangerous routes. This forces nearby countries to adopt similar physical barriers, leading to a ‘domino effect’, one that is very expensive for all involved.

Undoubtedly, the Syrian conflict and other ongoing situations of political instability and violence are the key drivers of the recent influx of refugees and migrants in Europe and elsewhere. However, they are not the only causes. Other global social and economic development factors are at play, many of them long term and systemic. Falling travel costs to Europe certainly play a part, as does information and networks. Global inequality is another key driver: migration is a better option than attempting upward mobility within the country in which you happen to be born. However, the current focus of the European policy response is mostly on sea crossings and border control. It pays almost no attention to these wider, and yet significant, trends of refugees and migrants journeys to Europe.

1. These figures do take into account the ‘German backlog’, a set of approximately 520,000 asylum applications which have been waiting to be processed throughout 2015 and 2016.

Figure i: The proportion of asylum applications from arrivals by sea ('overt') in 2015 and 2016



Sources: Eurostat and UNHCR

The European response: deterrence measures and border controls are expensive and mostly ineffective.

In pure financial terms, the European response has been swift. Significant funding has been mobilised at both national and regional levels to respond to the so-called 'crisis'. This funding has been deployed in two ways. First, on deterrence – stopping refugees and migrants at Europe's borders and addressing the root causes of migration in neighbouring and developing countries; and second, to cover the cost of resettling refugees and migrants in European member states. In both cases, the overall level of funding has increased at the same rate as new arrivals.

The costs of deterrence

Costs inside Europe

Inside Europe, the most visible response has been rapid border fortification: from 2015-2016, fences were proposed, or fence construction was begun, at Calais, the Hungary–Serbia border, the Hungary–Romania border, the Hungary–Croatia border, the Slovenia–Croatia border, the Austria–Slovenia border, the Austria–Italy border, the Macedonia–Greece border, the Latvia–Russia border and the Estonia–Russia border. Five fences built in the latter half of 2015 and early 2016 came to an estimated cost of €238 million. Once the other aspects of border control are included such as identity checks, surveillance, dog checks, deportation and border policing, our conservative estimate is that **at the very least, €1.7 billion was committed to measures inside Europe from 2014 to 2016 in an effort to reduce flows**. Given the poor transparency in data, this €1.7 billion figure presents only a partial picture of the true cost. It is important to emphasise that when all the costs for individual countries' spending are considered, this figure will be undoubtedly much higher (for example,

almost €700 million was spent on UK border controls). Further still, restricting people's movements and enhancing border control has a number of indirect costs. It can lead to long term economic losses as a result of reduced trade, tourism and transport provision, which could cost Europe up to €1.4 trillion (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016).

Costs beyond Europe's borders

European countries have also committed billions of euros in bilateral agreements and through Trust Funds, to increase economic opportunities at home, or in neighbouring countries, in an attempt to deter refugees and migrants from setting off on their journeys. **Since December 2014, €15.3 billion has been spent (including on the EU–Turkey deal and two targeted Trust Funds in Syria and Africa)**. Again this is likely to be a very conservative estimate.

Effects of these costs

Internal and externalised border controls are expensive. The evidence suggests that they can be effective in reducing flows, at least on the national level. In a number of cases, most recently through the EU–Turkey Deal, data shows that controlling a specific border can lead to a significant reduction of flows through that border. However, **our analysis suggests that border controls have, in many cases, simply rerouted refugees and migrants towards alternative, covert, routes**.

While aid can be effective at supporting economic development, and can contribute towards mitigating the root causes and drivers of migration and displacement (such as conflict), it is not clear that it contributes to reducing migration and displacement in general. In the short term, and in very poor countries, development tends to increase, rather than reduce, human mobility.

Asylum processing and support costs

The way in which asylum applications are processed, approved or declined is inconsistent across European countries. Whether an application is successful depends not only on where you are from but also on where you apply to – e.g. in 2015-2016 across Europe, 98% of asylum applications from Syrians were successful. However, while, in Slovenia all Syrian applications were approved, only 50% of were approved in Portugal. For asylum seekers from countries like Somalia and Afghanistan, the variation is even greater. Reporting of asylum procedural costs is also not uniform across Europe – the Netherlands reports an average annual cost of €28,804 per asylum seeker and Austria, €5,156.²

Despite these discrepancies, what is consistently clear is that the overall cost burden is large: **the reception, procedural and resettlement costs of people who arrived in 2015, and those arriving in 2016, will cost Europe €27.3 billion.**

Recommendations

The above analysis illustrates powerfully that Europe's response to the 'crisis' of refugee and migrant flows is an expensive undertaking. Yet these efforts are unlikely to significantly reduce the number of people arriving in Europe through different routes.

Therefore, Europe needs a new approach. It needs to abandon narrow, often expensive, policies and initiatives which attempt, but will ultimately fail, to reduce the number of people arriving and applying for asylum in Europe. What is needed is a pragmatic and coherent approach that effectively manages the movement of people in the medium and long term. It needs to shift from an emphasis on controlling and deterring migration, towards a pragmatic and effective approach to manage it better.

To do this, a new form of international and multilateral action is needed. While sovereign states will continue to be the key actors and decision-makers, individual countries cannot address, and effectively manage, migration alone – they will spend significant amounts of money trying, and failing. Whether this new model of global governance for managing flows of refugees and migrants can be achieved through old means and institutions – like the UN, international agreements, etc. – and sealed at global summits, is an increasingly urgent question. The private sector is a growing and dynamic actor on migration matters – they too have much to lose from overly restrictive policies. Equally, regional institutions and coalitions will continue to have a major role.

However, progress will be limited until the public, especially in transit and host countries, becomes more accurately informed about migration, and are reassured that plans are in place to manage it well. There is an



important objective in sharing accurate information with the public to reassure citizens that human mobility can, and should be, better managed to benefit all. To this end, this report makes the following recommendations:

- 1. European governments should facilitate and increase legal pathways so that they can monitor, and more effectively manage flows of refugees and migrants.** This report demonstrates that restrictive policies and tightened borders can result in more covert migration. This will make it harder, not easier, for governments to monitor migration and design suitable policies to manage it. Legal migration pathways will help governments predict flows, make pragmatic decisions about quotas, skills gaps, hosting costs and enhance the benefits to the economy. These pathways can be tailored to different countries (depending on labour market needs, skills gaps, etc.) and sit alongside the global asylum system that continues to guarantee protection for vulnerable refugees.
- 2. A new global alliance of migration and displacement data is needed.** This should be a collaborative effort between governments, specialised agencies (such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)) the private sector and international organisations. It should be aimed, in the first instance, at harmonising reporting and increasing the frequency of data from both traditional and non-traditional sources to build a more coherent and comprehensive picture of human mobility. In Europe, there is an urgent need to move away from focusing solely on new arrivals and instead to cross-check data on deaths, asylum processes and outcomes to build a much more accurate picture of both overt and covert flows.
- 3. Governments should commit to more transparency on deterrence costs, as well as the significant reception and procedural costs in both national and EU budgets.** Both national and EU parliaments must be given the ability to scrutinise these costs – to analyse whether these investments work and to deliver results. This transparency needs to extend to the wider public. The media tends to focus solely on arrivals data, and individual case studies, without looking at the broader facts and figures. If there was more dissemination of these costs, it would help inform a balanced and evidence-based public debate.
- 4. Forge new international and regional coalitions built around common interests and objectives that aim to ensure safe, controlled and well-managed migration.** This cannot be achieved by the UN alone, or through traditional multilateralism – the political stakes of sovereign states are too high. The private sector has a key role and should be involved in the development and implementation of such coalitions.



2. All figures from OECD/DAC 2016a, OECD/DAC 2016b, Massa 2016, and Eurostat.

Europe's refugees and migrants

Hidden flows, tightened borders and spiralling costs



But **890,000** people are still projected to claim asylum in Europe this year



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1. Introduction

Europe has become a key destination for a record number of refugees and migrants; numbers have increased threefold every year since 2012. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimate that in 2015, over one million people made the journey to Europe. These refugees and migrants make their way, usually across the Mediterranean, and are registered as arriving in Europe by official agencies. They are, what we term, ‘overt’ arrivals.

However, what this report highlights, is the discrepancy between the number of overt arrivals and the number of asylum applications. In 2015, while there were 1.1 million overt arrivals, there were 1.7 million asylum applications.³ A similar pattern is expected for 2016: based on current projections, there are likely to be over 890,000 asylum applications with only 330,000 overt arrivals. The difference between projected asylum applications and overt registered arrivals will be referred to in this report as those who arrived ‘covertly’.

Why is there such a discrepancy? How have so-called ‘covert’ refugees and migrants entered Europe without being registered? And who are these covert refugees and migrants?

This report is split into two parts. The first begins with an analysis of the main drivers of migration, explaining why this is more than an isolated border issue, and instead an issue of global mobility. It will then discuss the five major routes taken by refugees and migrants attempting to enter Europe. It details the peaks and troughs of flows

through these borders, highlighting the impact of border control investments. The first part concludes by analysing covert arrivals – the ways in which these people journey to Europe, their nationalities and the issues with overlooking this hidden form of migration.

The second part of this report analyses the European policy response to these global movements. First, we look at the expenditure incurred within Europe – building fences and enhancing border controls as a means of stemming flows through individual crossings. We then turn to ‘external’ investments – Trust Funds and aid spent in other regions to address the root causes of migration. Again, we analyse whether these investments have achieved their intended purpose, and the inherent limitations of spot investments in solving a global issue.

We then focus on a less visible cost, that of receiving and maintaining refugees. Based on the expected number of asylum applications in 2016, we estimate the European cost burden, and highlight the differences in costs between selected European countries. We also analyse asylum applications and decisions – who is applying where, and where are applicants most likely to be granted asylum.


We conclude this report with a series of policy recommendations aimed at European policy makers attempting to manage this global migration issue in a sustainable and holistic way. We take a step back from considering this as simply an isolated border issue and offer recommendations based, crucially, on addressing both overt and covert arrivals.

3. We include those who arrived in Germany in 2015, and registered their intent to apply for asylum, in the totals for 2015.

2. Why people move

Migration is a complex issue, and not a new phenomenon. People have always moved; whether as a result of conflict, internal pressures, economic opportunities or a desire to make the most of increased global mobility. While many of these people could accurately be termed ‘migrants’, many are forced to leave their homelands in search of a better life, often termed ‘refugees’ or ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) (see Box 1 on terminology). In recent years, mainly as a result of increased conflict, the number of refugees and IDPs worldwide has reached never before seen levels: 65.3 million in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). This is nearly 10% more than the number displaced by World War II (Proudfoot, 1956).

Figure 1: Worldwide numbers of displaced refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers, 2009-2015



Sources: UNHCR, UNRWA and IDMC.

Many refugees and IDPs are in situations of protracted displacement: just under half of all refugees have been displaced for 10 years (UNHCR 2016a). As refugees and IDPs spend long years in displacement, they start to search for alternatives to their situation. Migration to Europe is one such alternative. For example, a UNHCR survey of Afghans arriving in Greece in 2016 found that up to 20% had never actually lived in Afghanistan, but had instead been born in protracted displacement (UNHCR, 2016b; 2016c; and 2016d).

Box 1: Refugees, migrants and asylum seekers

Language is important. Berry et al. (2016) found that the terms used to describe refugees and migrants in the national press in the five countries they examined had an impact on the tone of the debate. We therefore do not use migrants as a catch-all term for the mix of refugees and migrants travelling to Europe. This report will refer to the following:

Migrants are people who travel voluntarily to improve their lives; either through finding work, gaining education, family reunion or other reasons. Some migrants may apply for asylum to avoid deportation and/or to give themselves time to find jobs in the informal economy.

In Europe, **refugees** are people who flee their own country through a well-founded fear of persecution. The most important legal instrument on refugees is the 1951 Geneva Convention (UN General Assembly, 1951). Legally, refugees become refugees the moment they leave their own country.


Asylum seekers are people formally applying for asylum in a country, or awaiting a decision. They may be refugees seeking recognition of their status or they may be persons eligible for subsidiary or humanitarian protection in Europe, if it is not safe for them to return to their own country (European Parliament and Council, 2011). The majority⁴ of those applying for asylum are either recognised as refugees or are granted protection of some form.

This report uses ‘refugees and migrants’ to cover: refugees, people otherwise entitled to protection and migrants.

For this reason, and those described below, since 2012, Europe has experienced a record number of refugees and migrants arriving on its shores. UNHCR and IOM estimate that in 2015, the number of people making the journey to Europe by sea and land as overt arrivals, stands at over 1 million.

4. 52.7% of asylum decisions made in 2015 and 59.3% of asylum decisions in 2016 (Source: Eurostat)

Figure 2: The flow of refugees and migrants to Europe, 2012-2016



Source: Projection based on UNHCR and IOM data on migration across the Mediterranean.

There is no doubt that the Syrian conflict and other ongoing situations of political instability and violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea and elsewhere are key drivers of the recent increase in refugees and migrants globally. However, they are not the only causes. Other factors are also at play, many of which are long term and systemic.


Some of these factors relate to existing numbers of refugees and displaced people. For example, there is increasing pressure on refugees in countries such as Iran and Pakistan that prompt them to seek asylum elsewhere (Pakistan Today, 2016). There is also a higher proportion of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers within a few borders of Europe (see Figure 3).

Other factors reflect the reality and experiences of the increased number of people on the move. More and more refugees and migrants know people who have successfully travelled to Europe. Social pathfinding by family, friends and acquaintances could explain the increase in flows (Cummings et al, 2015). Surveys of refugees and migrants by IOM have found that for some groups crossing the Mediterranean, over 70% had a first or second order relative in their destination country (IOM, 2016c and 2016d). More than half of the Syrians and Iraqis surveyed from October 2015 to May 2016 had relatives in the country of intended destination (IOM, 2016d).

Other factors are related to social and economic development globally. Falling travel costs to Europe play a part. The majority of refugees and migrants give the cost of travelling to Europe as being between \$1,000 and \$5,000


(IOM, 2016c; 2016d and 2016e). Remittances have been growing rapidly, and are now estimated to be more than three times the value of Official Development Assistance (ODA) transfers (see Figure 4). They can be an important source of funds for financing migration – well illustrated by the case described in ODI’s graphic novella, ‘Fleeing from the unknown’ about one person’s journey to the UK (ODI, 2016a).

Figure 3: The number of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers in refuge within one land border or one sea-crossing of Europe




Source: Analysis of UNHCR and UNRWA data.

Figure 4: Value of remittances and ODA, 1970-2015



Sources: World Bank and OECD.

Figure 5: Level and composition of global inequality (as measured by the Theil index)



Source: Milanovic, 2012.

More broadly, globalisation has been accompanied by rising wealth, and a growing middle-class with the ability to finance travel to Europe. Inequality is now defined by location, rather than by class (see Figure 5). In other words, where you are born is a stronger indication of your relative wealth than the class into which you are born. This creates a powerful motive for migration, especially since the gap between rich and poor is far greater in poor countries.

Further analysis by Milanovic found that citizenship alone explains more than 50% of the variability in global incomes (more than education, gender or other factors). While growth and redistribution can go some way towards addressing these inequalities, migration from poor to rich countries is a very – if not the most – effective way to increase income and reduce inequality. Moreover, for an individual, migration to a richer country is potentially more rewarding than attempting upward mobility within their own country.


3. 'Overt' and 'covert' migration to Europe

This report aims to go beyond the registered numbers of arrivals in Europe as stated by UNHCR, IOM and others. Instead, we analyse the extent of global mobility through the number of asylum applications. When a refugee or migrant arrives at a monitored border post and applies for asylum, they are labelled an 'arrival'. So when UNHCR states that over one million people arrived in Europe in 2015, they are referring to these registered or 'overt' arrivals. In the first six months of 2016, Europe saw 231,075 overt refugees and migrants. Taking into account the high seasonality of flows, we extrapolate to show that Europe will see close to 330,000 overt refugees and migrants arrive in 2016.

However, there is a huge discrepancy between this figure, and the number of people who apply for asylum. In 2015, there were 1.1 million registered arrivals but 1.7

million asylum applications. This therefore suggests that 600,000 people found their way into Europe through covert means, via routes that are not accounted for by official agencies or processes. In the first six months of 2016, European countries received 608,066 asylum applications – already a discrepancy of 376,991 people (the difference between the 608,066 asylum applications and the 231,075 registered, overt arrivals). Based on extrapolation, we conclude that Europe will receive over 890,000 asylum applications in 2016. The difference between projected asylum applications (890,000+ in 2016) and overt registered arrivals (330,000 in 2016) will be referred to in this report as those who arrived 'covertly'.⁵ Their numbers are increasing. As Figure 6 shows, the number of covert arrivals has shown a strong upward trend since 2008.

Figure 6: Asylum applications in Europe, as broken down by covert and overt arrivals, 2008-2016



Source: Analysis of Eurostat, UNHCR, IOM and BMI data.

5. These figures do not take into account the 'German backlog', a set of approximately 520,000 asylum applications which have been waiting to be processed throughout 2015 and 2016.

This is a complicated discussion, especially given the inconsistency in reporting. However, the differences highlighted above resonate for previous years as well as 2016, and point to a larger issue. Deterrent strategies tend to focus on national border investments only – keeping isolated refugees and migrants from singular crossings. And while these investments do deter this type of migration, and therefore overt numbers are down, they push people to alternative options and as a result the proportion of covert arrivals continues to increase.

This report demonstrates that restrictive policies and tightened borders displace migration to other, more covert routes. This makes it harder, not easier, for governments to monitor migration and design suitable policies to manage it. Legal migration pathways will help governments predict flows, make pragmatic decisions about quotas, skills gaps and hosting costs, and enhance the benefits to the economy.

This section begins by highlighting the common routes that refugees and migrants take to Europe, and the impact of isolated border investments to close these routes. We then go on to discuss the covert ways in which people reach Europe, and the problems with treating migration as an isolated border issue.

3.1. ‘Overt’ arrivals: routes to Europe

For those who choose to make the journey to Europe, there are a number of potential routes. Refugees and migrants can travel over land; travelling through Morocco to arrive in Spain, Greece or Turkey. Or they can come by sea – via the Canaries, or more recently, through the Mediterranean to Turkey, Spain, Italy and Malta. Table 1 details the five main migration routes to Europe, including their peak flow numbers, when they were effectively ‘closed’, and the most prevalent nationalities among people using these routes.

Box 2: Our sources, and the difficulties with counting refugees and migrants

This report relies on a number of data sources. To determine the number of refugees and migrants travelling on particular routes, we used data from UNHCR, IOM and Frontex. To analyse asylum applications and decisions, we worked from Eurostat information. In some cases, the tables available on Eurostat were used, but in most cases, the underlying databases were downloaded and then subject to cross tabulation. This data was further supplemented by other sources on specific issues of interest.

The data is not wholly coherent. For example, while UNHCR figures (UNHCR, 2016e) and IOM figures (IOM, 2016a) agree on arrivals by sea to Italy per month, they differ for most months for Greece. UNHCR overall totals are not always a sum of the individual totals of the numbers of refugees and migrants of different nationalities (UNHCR, 2016e). Arrivals by land are sometimes included, and sometimes not.

A further complication in generating conclusive figures is in accounting for the backlog of asylum applications in Germany at the end of 2015. Around half a million people were distributed to accommodation in advance of having their asylum claims registered. The figures in this report count these people as asylum applicants in 2015. This is discussed in Box 5. The figures in this report also adjust for the double counting of asylum seekers who passed through Hungary in 2015 – they were both registered there and at their final destination.

Table 1: Details of the five main migration routes to Europe

Route	How	From	To	Peak	Closed	Numbers of people	Main countries of origin	Death rate (IOM)	
1	The land and sea routes to Spain	Land or sea	Morocco	Ceuta and Melilla (Spain)	2014	2005	7,164 in 2015 2,130 by land in the first half of 2016 644 by boat or swimming in 2015 351 by boat or swimming in the first half of 2016	Sub-Saharan Africans prior to 2015. Now Syrians, Palestinians and sub-Saharan Africans. Syrians and Palestinians generally access Spain via the border crossings. Sub-Saharan African refugees and migrants are forced to swim or climb the fences.	
2	The Western Mediterranean route to Andalucía	Sea	Morocco	Andalucía		2004	3,464 in 2015 2,109 in the first five months of 2016	North West and sub-Saharan Africa	1.8%
3	West Africa to the Canaries	Sea	West Africa	Canaries	2006	2006	31,600 at peak in 2006 874 in 2015	West Africa	
4	The Eastern Mediterranean route via Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria	Land or sea	Turkey	Greece, and also by land to Bulgaria	2015	2012 (land) 2016 (sea)	162,000 to August 9 2016 862,000 in 2015 31,174 to Bulgaria in 2015 14,000 to Bulgaria in first half of 2016	Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq	0.1%
5	The Central Mediterranean route to Italy and Malta	Sea	Libya	Italy/Malta	2008	2009 (due to Italian push-back policy and war in Libya)	101,000 to August 9 2016 147,000 in 2015	Sub-Saharan Africa	3.6%

While effective individual national border controls have reduced the number of new, overt, arrivals, they have not stopped the large movement of people to Europe. Over time, routes change and new ones open up; the closing of specific borders simply diverts refugees and migrants to neighbouring countries, or to more dangerous routes. This forces nearby countries to adopt similar physical barriers, leading to a ‘domino effect’, one that is very expensive for all involved. We explore the issues surrounding the ‘costs of deterrence’ later in this report.

3.1.1. The land and sea routes to Spain

Until 2004, the majority of European-bound refugees and migrants crossed the sea to the Canaries, or to Andalucia in mainland Spain. As these numbers increased, so did surveillance, which reduced Mediterranean Sea crossings and led people to seek alternative land routes (European Commission, 2005). Of the European countries, only Spain has a land border with Africa; the Spanish autonomous cities of Melilla and Ceuta border Morocco. As a result, in 2004, these cities began to see large numbers of refugees and migrants trying to enter Europe via these land crossings.⁶

In 2005, after three deaths at the Melilla fence and 13 at the Ceuta fence, a six metre high double fence was erected, separated by a patrol road (Pinos, 2009). The fences, together with vigorous patrolling by both the Moroccan and Spanish authorities, reduced flows through these cities to less than 2,000 a year for the next five years. However, many still make the attempt: 18,000 sub-Saharan Africans attempted to scale the fences in 2014, and 12,000 were turned away by sea (Lanni, 2016).


After numbers began to grow again in 2014, the Moroccan authorities built an additional fence with a large

moat on their side of the border. This led some refugees and migrants to attempt a crossing by boat, by swimming and a range of other inventive methods. Recent attempts have included: a cyclist who tried to cross in July 2016 with a Spanish cycle club (detected after the use of a stolen passport); a rush at the border fence by 100 people in June 2016 (30 succeeded); a man who died trying to access Melilla through a sewer in June 2016; and a woman who tried to smuggle an eight-year-old boy in a suitcase in May 2015 (detected by an x-ray scanner). Other attempts have included a man hidden in a vehicle bumper in February 2016 (detected by his heartbeat, though he succeeded in crossing as he had to be taken to hospital) as well as people who have been found hiding in wheel-wells, secret compartments, luggage spaces and engine-spaces (The Local.es, 2015b; 2015c; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c and 2016d).

In the first half of 2016, UNHCR reported that 633 refugees and migrants entered Ceuta, and 1,497 entered Melilla. UNHCR has protested the policy of automatic return for those who cross the borders into Ceuta and Melilla but do not reach the Centre for Temporary Residence for Immigrants (CETI, in Spanish), stating that such automatic return without consideration of each individual’s circumstances is contrary to both international and European law (ACNUR, 2016). The case of the child in a suitcase is only one example of the way in which border control policies lead to family separation and place children at risk.

While the Moroccan border authorities use force to keep sub-Saharan African refugees and migrants from approaching the border posts, people of Middle-Eastern origin are more ethnically similar to the Moroccan population. Syrians or Palestinians can get closer to the border posts without attracting attention from authorities,

Figure 7: Refugees and migrants entering Ceuta and Melilla, 2005-2015



Sources: Amnesty International and Frontex.

6. The president of the government of Melilla stated that 15,000 refugees and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa had attempted to scale the fence between January 2004 to September 2005, but that only 350 had attempted to do so from 1998 to 2003 (McLean, 2005).

and congregate nearby to wait for a chance to rush the border (Negueruela et al., 2016). When the word was given that refugee camps near Melilla and Ceuta were to be dismantled, more than 600 people rushed the Melilla fence in a single day. Only 35 were successful and five people were injured. Therefore, while these borders are still flashpoints, border control methods have succeeded in keeping the majority of refugees and migrants from crossing into Spain by land.

As such, some attempt to swim the short journey along the coast. The worst month for this type of crossing was in February 2014. A group of 250 people attempting to swim to Ceuta around the fence were fired on with rubber bullets and teargas by Spanish police – 15 died and the 23 who reached the beach were returned to Morocco (Jesuit Refugee Service, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015).

3.1.2. The Western Mediterranean route to Andalucía

Refugees and migrants can cross over sea from Morocco to mainland Spain (The Local.es, 2015a). The numbers attempting the Western Mediterranean Sea crossing to Spain (including the Ceuta and Melilla routes above) have increased each month in 2016, compared with 2014 and 2015, but the overall numbers remain relatively small.

Despite the relatively short voyage, this route is incredibly dangerous – as of 22 August 2016, 57 people

on this route have died or are missing (Missing Migrants Project, 2016).


One group making its way to Spain are Palestinian refugees from Syria. UNRWA reports that Jordan hosts 16,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, while Lebanon hosts 42,500. Yet Jordan effectively closed its borders to Palestinian refugees from Syria early in the conflict, and Lebanon did so in May 2015. Refugees have therefore made their way to Spain. UNHCR reported that 596 Palestinian refugees arrived in Spain in 2015 – most arriving in Melilla via Syria (Negueruela et al., 2016).

3.1.3. West Africa to the Canaries

The effective closure of the migration route via Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 saw a huge increase in migration from West Africa through the Spanish Canaries (Canary Islands). Numbers peaked at over 30,000 in 2006 before the launch of Operation Hera, which reduced flows to almost zero by 2010 (see Box 3). Improved maritime patrols and radar have played a key role in reducing flows, supported by trade deals and development aid to encourage West African nations to back the controls.


As shown in Figure 9, after falling to very low levels, the total number of refugees and migrants taking this route rose again in 2015, but remained far below their 2006 levels. In terms of the relative danger of taking this route, there are no good statistics on the mortality rate.

Figure 8: Numbers of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Spain, January 2014-July 2016




Source: UNHCR.

Figure 9: Refugee and migrant flows to the Canaries, 2006-2015



Source: Frontex.

Figure 10: Countries of origin for asylum applications in Spain, January 2015-March 2016



Source: Eurostat.

Box 3: Operation Hera


During 2006, two operations were launched by Frontex, Hera I and II, focusing on the flow of refugees and migrants through the Canary Islands. Hera I identified people thought to be migrating through illegal means in Spain, and returned over 6,000 of them to their countries of origin. Hera II was a joint sea surveillance operation. Beginning on 11 August, it ‘brought together technical border surveillance equipment from several member states to enhance the control of the area between West Africa and the Canaries’ (UK Parliament, 2008). Its intended purpose was to divert vessels and help reduce the number of deaths. It was the longest operation coordinated by Frontex, and had a total budget of €3.5 million. Throughout the operation, over 8,000 people were stopped, normally on small fishing boats close to the African coast. It directly contributed to the sharp decrease in refugee and migrant numbers (migration through illegal means to the Canaries in 2007 was half of what it was in 2006), and helped legitimise the operations of the newly established Frontex (UK Parliament, 2008).

The published data does not give the nationalities of those arriving in Spain, but we do have data on asylum applications in Spain (all arrivals in Spain have to make an asylum claim in line with agreed EU procedures, known as the Dublin Regulation⁷). Spanish asylum application data shows that asylum claimants are mixed between those crossing the Mediterranean and those arriving by other

means. Therefore: Syrian, Palestinian, Algerian, Moroccan, Malian, Nigerian, Somali and Cameroonian asylum applicants have probably crossed the Mediterranean (or entered via Ceuta and Melilla or the Canaries). Ukrainian, Chinese and Latin American asylum claimants have all arrived by other means.

7. The Dublin III Regulation (previously the Dublin II Regulation and the Dublin Convention) sets out which EU state is responsible for dealing with an asylum claim. Typically, it is the first EU country of entry but there are exceptions.


Figure 11: Refugee and migrant flows on the Eastern Mediterranean route, 2009-2014



Source: Frontex (2015, p.21).


Note: This chart was digitised from a printed chart. The estimated accuracy of digitisation is plus or minus 20 persons.

Figure 12: Refugee and migrant flows crossing the Mediterranean to Greece, January 2014-August 2016



Source: UNHCR.

Figure 13: Countries of origin for arrivals in Greece, January 2015-July 2016



Source: UNHCR.

Note: there were almost no arrivals after March 2016, so the changes in the balance in the months of April to June 2016 is not important.

3.1.4. The Eastern Mediterranean route to Turkey and Greece

The Eastern Mediterranean route originally began as a sea route, with only a few thousand people a month entering Turkey and Greece. However, it quickly changed to a land route once refugees and migrants realised how porous the Turkish–Greek border was – by 2010, the numbers crossing reached 8,000 (Frontex, 2015). The deployment of 1,800 additional border guards on the Greek side of the land border helped reduce flows to less than a thousand a month (Frontex, 2013). In 2013, refugees and migrants used a mix of crossing by sea and crossing by land to Bulgaria, but by 2014, crossing by sea to the Greek Islands was the norm.

The Eastern Mediterranean route was responsible for the bulk of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe in 2015. Flows peaked at over 200,000 people in October. The beginning of 2016 saw flows several times their 2014 equivalent, but flows were quickly stemmed upon the implementation of the EU–Turkey deal (see Box 4). Since then, the number of refugees and migrants crossing to Greece has dropped from thousands to only a few per day.

The Eastern Mediterranean route (where the Greek Islands are only a few kilometres off the Turkish Coast) has always been the safest sea route. This is reflected in the mortality rates – which have been relatively low – averaging less than 0.1% in 2015.

The refugees and migrants crossing to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean are mostly from countries experiencing conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the case of Afghanistan and Palestine, the arrivals are people who have been settled refugees for some years, who experienced further displacement by recent conflict or political developments. As can be seen in Figure 13, Syria accounts for 52% of arrivals in Greece in 2016, with Afghanistan accounting for 27%, and Iraq for 17%. This is similar to the pattern seen in 2015.

3.1.5. The Central Mediterranean route to Italy and Malta

As patrolling increased on the West African route in 2006, the numbers of refugees and migrants using the Central Mediterranean route jumped: from 20,000 a year between 2002–2007 to 40,000 in 2008. The Italian Government instigated a push-back policy: stopping people close to the Libyan shore and returning them to Libya. This policy, together with the worsening internal armed conflict in Libya, dramatically reduced the number of refugees and migrants using this crossing to only 5,000 in 2010.

With the effective closure of the Eastern Mediterranean route, this is now the busiest Mediterranean route to Europe. It shows strong seasonality, with peak flows in the

Box 4: The EU–Turkey deal

Agreed in March 2016, the EU–Turkey deal stipulates that any asylum seeker whose application has been declared ‘inadmissible’ will be returned from Greece to Turkey. In exchange, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU. According to the BBC (2016a), priority will be given to those who have not tried to enter illegally. The number is capped at 72,000. The benefits to Turkey include Turkish nationals gaining access to the visa-free Schengen zone, €3 billion in aid to support refugees and migrants within Turkey and the issue of Turkish membership to the EU would be revisited.

Following the projections, without the EU–Turkey deal, approximately 3 million people would have crossed into Europe in 2016. However, instead, only 330,000 are projected to do. Many elements of the agreement are working as planned including the one-for-one acceptance of Syrian refugees in place of rejected asylum seekers returned to Turkey (European Commission, 2016a). However, it is not clear how politically secure the EU–Turkey deal is – one of the items of the agreement (visa-free travel for Turks in the Schengen zone) has not been implemented.


There have also been questions about the legality of the deal as it involves returning refugees and migrants apprehended at sea, or at the land border, to Turkey without considering their individual circumstances. This is similar to the push-back policy used by the Italian Government in 2009 and which the European Court of Human Rights ruled against in 2012 (*Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy*). There is also a discussion about the extent to which Turkey is a safe place of return.

The EU–Turkey deal has been supported by NATO; NATO ships have been engaged in ‘rescues’⁸ in the Aegean Sea since March 2016. They return those intercepted to Turkey. The justification for interception is that the boats used on the routes are overcrowded, those aboard are therefore in need of rescue and all ships are obliged to render assistance under maritime law (*Migrants at Sea*, 2016).

European summer – the safest time for crossing in terms of weather. However, the mortality rate on this route is by far the highest – 3.6% of refugees and migrants died attempting the route in 2016. In May 2016 alone, some 1,130 of those attempting the crossing died (a mortality rate of 5.6%). And this was not even the highest mortality rate for this route – February 2005 saw a mortality rate of 7.2%.

8. While NATO describes the apprehensions at sea as ‘rescues’. (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm), UNHCR refers to the events as ‘apprehensions and interceptions’ (<https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=1887>)

Figure 14: Refugee and migrant flows crossing the Mediterranean to Italy and Malta, January 2014-August 2016




Source: UNHCR.

In 2016, the refugees and migrants crossing to Italy and Malta came predominantly from sub-Saharan Africa. This reflects the 2015 pattern, and is broadly similar to the flows to the Canaries or via the Western Mediterranean. Some of these countries are undergoing serious conflict, while others are severely repressive. While refugees and migrants from Syria accounted for nearly one fifth of arrivals in January 2015, the number of Syrians has fallen rapidly. Instead, Eritrea has become a major source of refugees and migrants using the Central Mediterranean route.

While the routes described above are the primary ways refugees and migrants reach Europe, it is important to note that there are a number of minor routes that are also in use, including overland via Bulgaria, or via Russia.

Figure 15: Countries of origin for arrivals in Italy, January-June 2016



Source: UNHCR.

3.2. 'Covert' arrivals and asylum applications

The routes described above are the most monitored routes to Europe – UNHCR and IOM regularly publish official arrival figures. In effect, these are the overt routes to Europe. However, in 2015, while UNHCR and IOM reported that approximately one million refugees and migrants crossed the Mediterranean, Eurostat reported that over 1.7 million had applied for asylum. In addition, Germany had another 520,000 waiting to apply for asylum.

This discrepancy between official arrival figures and people applying for asylum, continues in 2016. UNHCR and IOM reported that from January-June, 231,075 refugees and migrants 'overtly' crossed the Mediterranean, but approximately 608,000 claimed asylum in Europe in the same period. We estimate that, if current trends continue, roughly 330,000 people will cross the Mediterranean this year ('overt' arrivals), but more than 890,000 will apply for asylum in Europe.

Before discussing this gap we need to address two issues: that of undercounting asylum seekers in Germany (see Box 5), and the effective double counting of some asylum seekers because of the policies adopted by Hungary.

Germany was the largest recipient of asylum seekers in Europe in 2014 and 2015, but was not able to register all applications before the end of the year (BPB, 2016). This was a relatively minor number (less than 50,000) in 2014, but became over half a million in 2015 (BPB, 2016). Therefore, any official arrival figures in Germany will be far below the total number of asylum applications (as they process the backlog).

In addition, Hungary's actions have led to double-counting. Hungary insisted that, in accordance with EU rules, all those seeking asylum in the EU should make a formal application on arrival in Hungary. Many did so,

Box 5: The backlog of unregistered asylum claims in Germany in 2014 and 2015

Those who intend to apply for asylum in Germany are registered in the EASY-system, which records a country of origin and the German province to which the asylum seeker will be assigned. The asylum application is then made in the province of assignment.

However, there have been ongoing issues with the under- and over-reporting of EASY-system registrations, compared with the official number of asylum applications. For example, in 2015, 1,091,895 refugees and migrants were registered in the EASY-system (BMI, 2016) yet only 441,895 asylum applications were registered (Eurostat).

A further complication is the fact that approximately 130,000 of those registered in the EASY-system in 2015 failed to appear in the province to which they were assigned. Singleton et al. (2016) suggests that the EASY-system often overstates the number of arrivals by about 10% due to double registration. Another reason for the discrepancy may be that people often choose to join family members elsewhere instead of going to their assigned province (Preuss, 2016).


In this report, we have dealt with this by adding the number of persons who registered with the EASY system and went to the province that they were assigned, but did not have their asylum claim registered to the total of asylum applications or Germany.

only to continue their journey to the northwest, leaving the Hungarian authorities to treat their asylum application as being withdrawn. We have assumed that all of the asylum applications withdrawn between February 2015-January 2016 in Hungary are persons who went on to lodge asylum applications elsewhere.

After adjustment for under- and over-counting, in 2015, there is a discrepancy of 662,444 persons between the total number of asylum applications and registered overt arrivals. This analysis is based on the following assumptions:

- All of the flows across the Mediterranean were recorded by UNHCR and IOM. This is considered to be very likely because of the focus on this issue in 2015. Unrecorded arrivals are treated as covert arrivals.
- All of those crossing the Mediterranean applied for asylum. This is considered to be mostly true. Not all those crossing apply for asylum. Some have been trafficked and others enter the informal economy directly (Malakooti, 2016; Negueruela et al., 2016). Arrivals not applying for asylum would increase the estimate.
- There was no double-counting of asylum claims, apart from in Hungary. This is considered to be largely true as those intending to apply for asylum in a particular country are reluctant to do so elsewhere (Negueruela et al., 2016). Further double-counting would reduce the estimate.
- Where people left Hungary, their asylum claim was effectively withdrawn in the following month. This is considered highly likely. The number of asylum claims withdrawn from February 2015-January 2016 inclusive, totalled 117,914. Hungary had more withdrawn asylum claims than the rest of Europe put together even though only 13% of Europe's 2015 first time asylum claims were made in Hungary (Eurostat).
- All the cases where refugees and migrants registered with the EASY-system in Germany, but failed to appear at their accommodation, were cases of double-counting. This is considered mostly true. Double-counting is a known problem with the EASY-system (Singleton et al., 2016). If double-counting was not the case, this would increase the estimate.
- No American or European refugees and migrants were captured in the IOM and UNHCR figures for crossing the Mediterranean. This is mostly true. Full nationality data is not available for arrivals in 2015, but there have been small numbers of refugees and migrants from the Americas (mostly from the Dominican Republic) and from Europe (mostly from Turkey) to Greece in 2016. American and European refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean would increase the estimate.
- Year-end and lag effects are ignored except for the German backlog in 2015 and an assumed lag of one month in asylum application withdrawals in Hungary. Any further backlog would increase the estimate.
- The effect of the withdrawal of asylum applications, other than in Hungary, is ignored as such withdrawals may relate to claims made before 2015, or may be followed by new asylum applications.

Figure 16: Comparison of overt flows of refugees and migrants and the number of asylum applications in Europe from 2008-2015, with the difference shown above the columns



Sources: Analysis of data from UNHCR, IOM, Amnesty International, Eurostat, BMI, BDB and Preuss.


So who are these 662,444 covert arrivals, whose number increased so dramatically in 2015?

Of the covert arrivals:

- In the Middle East, just over 50% of the covert arrivals were from Iraq, and less than 33% from Syria.
- The arrivals from the Balkans were overt, in the sense that they openly joined the flows of refugees and migrants sweeping through the Balkans on their way north. However, they should be regarded as covert as they were not recorded in the same way that those crossing the Mediterranean were. Albanians and Kosovars make up just under 75% of this group.
- Over 95% of the Central Asian group were from Afghanistan.
- Ukrainians and Russians account for 85% of the Eastern Europe group.
- Pakistan alone accounts for nearly 67% of the South Asian group.


The regions from which almost all the arrivals are covert include the Balkans, Europe, Western Asia, East Asia and the Americas.

Figure 17: Countries of origin for European 'covert' arrivals in 2015



Sources: Analysis of data from UNHCR and IOM, Eurostat, BMI and Preuss.

Figure 18: Comparing the economies of the sources of ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ arrivals



Sources: Analysis of data from UNHCR and IOM, Eurostat, BMI, Preuss and World Bank.

The biggest difference between the overt and covert arrivals is that covert arrivals are much more likely to come from richer countries. Nearly half the covert arrivals are from upper-middle-income countries (using World Bank definitions). The contrast would be even more stark if those who emigrated from the Balkans (who make up more than two thirds of the covert low-income class) were removed from the covert to the overt category. The reason is simple: entering Europe covertly is expensive and families in upper-middle-income countries are the most likely to have the necessary resources to send a family member to Europe.

Covert routes can include:

- Gaining a visa and then applying for asylum on arrival;
- Traveling on false documents and then applying for asylum on arrival, or overstaying;
- Traveling on valid documents containing false information;
- Children who are born in Europe illegally;
- Traveling overland concealed in vehicles; and/or
- Bribery of border officials.

Covert entry is not easy. Every year, thousands of non-EU nationals are refused entry at the EU’s external border. However, it is clear that many people do succeed in entering covertly. Every year since 2008, between 400,000 and 600,000 illegally present third-country nationals are asked to leave the EU (Eurostat). The majority of these are not asylum applicants. We are only able to measure the number of covert arrivals who apply for asylum and have no estimate of the number of arrivals who enter the informal economy without making an asylum application.

From this data, we conclude that Europe is seeing a growing wave of migration through irregular, covert, means. This type of migration is different to the highly visible, overt, migration that involves crossing the Mediterranean. In this report, we show that the number of asylum applications in Europe far exceeds the number of recorded refugee and migrant arrivals. The figures show a growing trend in arrivals that is only, in part, explained by the Syrian conflict. In the absence of alternative legal pathways to safe migration, the majority of new asylum applicants come from a range of mostly middle-income countries and from all corners of the world.

3.3. Conclusions

Rigorous border controls by European authorities can constrain flows on any one route, as demonstrated by the closure of the Ceuta and Melilla routes, the success of Operation Hera on stemming the numbers taking the Canaries route, and the effectiveness of the EU–Turkey deal on reducing the numbers taking the Eastern Mediterranean route.

However, the closure of one route tends to be followed by the rise of others. This can be seen in:

- The rise in flows to the Canaries after the effective closure of Ceuta and Melilla;
- The rise in the Eastern Mediterranean route after the constriction of the Libya to Italy route; and
- The rise in the Eastern Mediterranean sea route after the effective closure of the land crossing from Turkey to Greece.

These new routes are often more dangerous and ‘covert’.

In addition, if people are unable to cross over country borders, there is a strong likelihood that they will end up in unsafe, makeshift ‘camps’ and ‘villages’. The ‘Jungle’ at Calais is the most notorious, housing nearly 7,000⁹ refugees from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. The tent ‘village’ at Idomeni, on the Greek/Macedonia border is another example. Most recently, Italy has expressed their fear that ‘another Calais’ will spring up on its border with France, at Ventimiglia. Hundreds of refugees and migrants are also stranded on Italy’s border with Switzerland. These camps are highly visible indicators that efforts to curb migration may stop people coming through a border, but have little effect on the overall numbers making the journey.

Forecasts show that Europe will still see approximately 890,000 new asylum applications by the end of 2016.

This number is nearly three times the overall number of projected new arrivals across the Mediterranean (330,000). This is largely due to the covert refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and yet not included in officially reported arrival figures.

Our initial analysis based on 2015 and 2016 data suggests that these covert refugees and migrants are only partially explained by the Syrian conflict: less than one-third of the covert arrivals making asylum applications in 2015 were from Syria. The majority of new asylum applicants come from a number of mostly middle-income countries around the world. Moreover, the drama of the ‘overt’ arrivals overshadowed the number of covert arrivals, which has increased almost every year from 2008 to 2015.

9. The census carried out by the Pas-de-Calais prefecture found 6,901 residents there in mid-August 2016. This contrasts with an NGO census earlier in August that found more than 9,100 in the camp. It is not clear whether people were under-counted in the official census or were over-counted in the NGO one (<https://www.rt.com/news/356567-calais-jungle-population-record/>)

4. Policy response: the costs of deterrence

In light of these findings, we have analysed the effectiveness of the European policy response, specifically, the money involved in reducing new migration flows and in dealing with the surge of asylum applications across Europe. ‘Effectiveness’ is discussed here in terms of these policies’ explicit objectives: minimising flows into Europe. However, it is recognised that a number of other measures, including levels of adherence to international norms regarding treatment of refugees and migrants, could serve as alternative benchmarks for migration policy success.

As the numbers of refugees and migrants attempting entry to Europe have on the whole increased, individual nations and the EU have responded quickly by implementing a range of measures aimed at deterring or reducing migration. Importantly, while none of these measures are new, they have been mobilised at an increasing pace from late 2014 onwards.

Money spent on measures aimed at deterring migration can be split into two categories. First, within Europe, money is spent to stop people in their tracks by fortifying controls at European borders. Second, outside Europe, money is spent on attempts to externalise controls and address the root causes of migration. Both types of expenditure seek to influence people’s decisions to make the journey in the first instance. However, the evidence presented above, as well as the work of Hagen-Zanker and Mallett (2016), suggests that migration policies alone are not likely to significantly affect migration journeys – people may be deterred from one route but will attempt others. It is therefore vital to better understand whether the financial resources invested in deterring or controlling migration lead to concrete results.

4.1. Expenditure inside Europe

4.1.1. Stopping people in their tracks

As entries to Europe and asylum applications spiked in the second half of 2015, perhaps the most visible sign of the so-called ‘crisis’ of refugee and migrant flows was the speed with which countries began erecting walls and fences at their borders. In 2015 and 2016, fences were proposed, or fence construction was begun, at Calais, the Hungary–Serbia border, the Hungary–Romania border, the Hungary–Croatia border, the Slovenia–Croatia border, the Austria–Slovenia border, the Austria–Italy border, the Macedonia–Greece border, the Latvia–Russia border and the Estonia–Russia border. While border fencing is not a new strategy, the speed with which fences have gone up in Europe in such a short space of time has been startling.

The costs of border fencing are difficult to estimate. There is scarce reliable data on the matter. However, the available data indicates that the building of fences is a costly endeavour. One source claimed in April 2016 that since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, countries had built or started 1,200 km of border fencing, at a cost of at least €500 million (Reuters, 2015). While this is difficult to verify, our analysis suggests that this figure may be a very conservative estimate. As Table 2 shows, just seven fences built in the past five years are estimated at a total cost of €294.5 million. Indeed, as European nations rushed to secure their borders, even five of the fences built in the latter half of 2015 and early 2016 came to an estimated cost of €238 million.

Table 2: Estimated costs of border fencing, sample of seven fences from 2011-2016

Country	Border	Year construction began	Length (km)	Estimated cost (euros)
Greece	Turkey	2011	12.5	5,330,000 ¹⁰
Bulgaria	Turkey	2013	132	51,100,000 ¹¹
Hungary	Serbia	2015	175	70,840,000 ¹²
Austria	Slovenia	2015	3.7	293,289 ¹³
Slovenia	Croatia	2015	670	80,000,000 ¹⁴
Latvia	Russia	2016	3 (Phase 1)	17,000,000 ¹⁵
Estonia	Russia	2016	90	70,000,000 ¹⁶

While fences are the most visible sign of border fortification, the phenomenon goes far beyond this remit. Other measures associated with border control include identity checks, surveillance, dog checks, deportation and border policing – all of which come at a cost.¹⁷

UK expenditure at Calais gives one clear example of the level of resources that can be poured into border control on a national frontier. Since 2014, the UK government has committed at least £48 million to border controls at Calais (BBC News, 2015; 2016; Prime Minister's Office, UK, 2016). While this expenditure included construction of a 15ft fence along the motorway leading to the port (and more recently, plans for a £1.9 million 1 km long wall¹⁸), it also covered funding police officers, freight search teams, sniffer dogs, detection technology (including heartbeat and carbon dioxide detectors), a 'control and command centre' and flights to deport refugees and migrants to origin countries. The costs at Calais come on top of the UK's annual border force budget, which for 2016-2017 is expected to amount to £558.1 million (House of Commons Hansard, 2016).

Many other countries in Europe have taken similar measures. As fences have gone up across Europe, so too have overall controls at borders. Most significantly, this extends to areas where little to no border control has previously existed. For example, from mid-2015, temporary border checks were imposed in Shengen Zone

countries including Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary and Slovakia. In January 2016, Sweden imposed controls on the Øresund Bridge, a busy route linking Sweden and Denmark. The Øresund Bridge checks have been estimated to cost 1.2 million SEK per day to enforce (approximately €125,000), a cost borne jointly by Danish rail operator DSB and the Swedish public transportation company, Skånetrafiken (Sveriges Radio, 2015). In May, the EU agreed to a six-month extension on border controls within the Schengen area.


Costly national-level fortification of borders has been mirrored by a heavy increase in border control at the EU-level. Since 2014, the budget of Frontex has almost doubled year on year, going from €97.9 million in 2014 to €254 million in 2016 (EU Observer 2014; 2016). Similarly the budget of the EU Internal Security Fund (ISF) Borders and Visa increased from €19.6 million in 2014, to €51 million in 2015, and to €148 million in 2016 (European Commission, 2014; 2015; 2016e; 2016f).

It is almost certain that these figures will not be fully representative of the total amount of money spent inside Europe on attempts to deter migration. Most likely, the costs presented here represent only a very partial picture of a much bigger complex of deterrent measures, comprised of a multitude of national-level costs and EU-wide measures. However, the data presented here alone documents €1.7 billion committed to measures inside Europe from 2014-2016 in efforts to reduce flows, almost €700 million of which covers UK border controls.

What is impressive is not just the scale, but also the pace of increase in these costs. When compared with the numbers of refugees and migrants documented in the previous section, these budget increases match the increases in numbers attempting journeys to Europe. For example, Figure 19 compares the increase in the Frontex budget, with the number of first time asylum applications between 2008-2015. In a global response often characterised by inaction and inadequate political leadership, these figures are significant, showing that, at least in terms of committing financial resources to fortifying borders, Europe has acted quickly in response to the increased inflows of people.

10. The figure given here is the midpoint between the confirmed construction cost (€3.16 million) and the highest actual cost reported by the media (€7.5 million) (<http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/MIDAS-REPORT.pdf>).
11. Balkan EU, 2016 (<http://www.balkan.eu.com/price-tag-lengthening-bulgarian-turkish-border-fence-rises-100m-leva/>).
12. Reuters, 2015 (<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-fence-insight-idUSKCN0RN0FW20150923>).
13. The Local, 2016 (<http://www.thelocal.at/20160210/austria-set-to-construct-more-border-fences>)
14. Reuters, 2016.
15. Ukraine Today, 2016 (<http://uatoday.tv/society/phase-one-of-fence-construction-along-the-latvian-russian-border-complete-619644.html>).
16. Up North, 2016 (<http://upnorth.eu/estonia-to-build-90km-fence-along-russian-border/>).
17. Data collected by The Migrants' Files suggests that from 2000-2014, the 28 EU member states plus Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Iceland spent at least €11.3 billion on deportations (<http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/>).
18. The Guardian, 2016 (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/uk-immigration-minister-confirms-work-will-begin-on-big-new-wall-in-calais>)

Figure 19: Relationship between the number of asylum applications in Europe and the Frontex budget, 2008-2015



Source: Frontex.

4.1.2. Wider costs to the economy and society

The costs of imposing border controls in areas which previously enjoyed free movement are not limited to the direct costs of border enforcement. A number of studies have pointed to the short- and long-term economic losses that would result from reintroducing border controls within the Schengen area. France Stratégie estimate that such controls would cost France €1 to 2 billion in the short term, given increased freight transport costs, impacts on cross-border workers and the reduction in tourist numbers (France Stratégie, 2016). The same study estimates that the long-term impact to France due to lost trade would be equivalent to over €10 billion, excluding any impacts on foreign investment and labour mobility. Meanwhile, a study by Bertelsmann Stiftung came to more pessimistic conclusions, estimating an economic impact of anywhere from €77 to €235 billion for Germany by 2025, and €470 billion to €1.4 trillion across the whole EU (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). In the case of the Øresund Bridge¹⁹, delays due to checks are reported to be costing rail operator DSB €1.2 million a month in lost business (New York Times, 2016).

The moral cost

The practices followed at borders, such as the policy of automatic return in Ceuta and Melilla, are not in accordance with European humanitarian and legal norms. These procedures have an effect on the refugees and migrants, as well as on the enforcers themselves. We need to apply the founding European principles and international normative standards when considering these borders and the people they are keeping out.

Box 6: The differing impact of refugees and migrants on the economy

The difference between refugees and migrants is that nations have a humanitarian duty to welcome refugees, while it is in their economic self-interest to welcome migrants.

Research on the economic integration of migrants has found that there is a 'refugee gap'. In her literature review on the labour market integration of resettled refugees, Ott (2013) notes that: 'Analyses in multiple countries have shown that resettled refugees perform worse in measures of labour market integration compared to other immigrants and individuals in the short term, even when controlling for differences in demographics such as age, education level, and level of host country language acquisition'.

This gap is hardly surprising given the differing motivations of refugees and migrants, and the different psychological baggage they may be carrying. Refugees may take longer to integrate, but in time, they too become net contributors to the economy.

Some of the refugees and migrants dying in their attempts to reach Europe are people whose claim to refugee status would be immediately recognised. One of their key drivers is not economics but the desire to live in a country where fundamental human rights are guaranteed. Failing to espouse our fundamental values in dealing with

19. While the bridge is outside the Schengen area, it is still a border where, historically, identification checks had never been carried out.

refugees and migrants will lead to the erosion of those values.

The current EU agreement with Turkey also raises legal and moral issues. Other countries will take these approaches and apply them to their own refugee and migrant concerns (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016). However, of greater importance for Europeans is that some of the practices will inevitably spread from the border and influence how authorities behave more widely towards refugees and migrants in Europe.

The opportunity cost

There is an argument that Europe needs more refugees and migrants. In a paper from Deutsche Bank, Forkerts-Landau (2015) noted that without the influx of migrants, Germany was forecast to see economic growth drop from 1.5% per annum to just 0.5% due to an aging population. Germany is not the only European country facing increasing dependency ratios (with fewer and fewer workers supporting more and more elderly welfare claimants).

Clemens (2011) argues that the opportunity cost of barriers to migration is far higher than barriers to trade in goods or services or to capital. Indeed, the gains from reducing barriers to migration ‘may be much larger than those available through any other shift in a single class of global economic policy’.

There is ample evidence of the benefits of migration.²⁰ Peri (2009) found robust evidence that people who have migrated increased total factor productivity: a 1% increase in employment in a US state due to immigration led to an 0.5% increase in income per worker in that state. Boubtane et al. (2015) found that refugees and migrants have a small but positive impact on GDP per capita.

Bellini et al. (2013) found that cultural diversity was associated with greater productivity and that there was evidence for a causal link between diversity and productivity. This echoed earlier work by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) which found that diversity had a positive impact on wages in US cities. Alesina et al. (2016) show that that ‘the diversity of immigrants relates positively to measures of economic prosperity’.

By restricting flows of refugees and migrants, we risk missing out on these benefits.

4.2. Beyond Europe’s borders

Vast sums of money have been poured into additional measures away from European soil in an attempt to reduce flows onto the continent.

4.2.1. Externalisation

In addition to rapid border fortification within Europe, a significant trend has been the ‘externalisation’ of border controls. Between 2015 and 2016, the EU committed €300 million to strengthening security and border control in countries outside the EU (European Commission, 2016b).

Externalisation has been a feature of European policy for over a decade, having been formalised and confirmed by the 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (Red Cross, 2013). However, Europe’s policy of externalisation has increased in response to the large numbers entering Europe, most prominently through the EU–Turkey deal (see Box 4). The deal included a €6 billion package that was to be channelled outside of Europe from 2016–2018 to support a facility for refugees in Turkey.

4.2.2. Addressing the ‘root causes of migration’

Beyond externalised border controls, Europe’s second strategy outside its own borders aims to address what it deems root causes of migration to Europe – essentially, discouraging people from making the decision to embark on a journey. Funds have been mobilised through development and humanitarian pathways, with the view of both supporting economic development, and improving conditions for refugees and displaced persons in developing nations.²¹ Like with border fortification, this is not a new trend, however the strategy has been mobilised on an unexpected scale. These targeted funds come on top of total aid flows from the EU and its member states, which, according to the European Commission have recently averaged €4.4 billion per year (2016d).

In December 2014, the EU launched the Regional Trust Fund in response to the crisis in Syria, also known as the Maddad Fund. It merged various individual contributions and EU instruments into one fund which primarily addresses the ‘long-term needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, as well as supporting host communities and their administrations’ (European Commission, 2016c). These include basic education, healthcare, water infrastructure and support for economic opportunities. The target is €1 billion – to date, three quarters has been raised (European Commission, 2016c).

Following the Maddad Fund, at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015, the EU launched an Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. This fund targeted origin countries in Africa, primarily encouraging in-country economic opportunities, education and national migration management strategies. The fund was boosted by the June 2016 EU Partnership Framework on Migration, which, as well as increasing the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, laid out new and existing measures to support

20. While migration is good for the economy it is not good for everyone. Dancygier and Donnelly (2013) found people’s attitude to migration was influenced by the expected impact of migration on their sector of employment.

21. There is a certain degree of overlap here with policies of externalisation, with some trust fund allocations targeting border control under a broader development remit.

key countries in an attempt to reduce flows to Europe. This totalled approximately €9 billion, which was to be distributed in the next four years (European Commission, 2016d). This framework includes:

- €3.6 billion already committed to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and €1 billion from the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis (the Maddad Fund);
- Nearly €2.4 billion in total pledged contributions at the London Conference from the EU and its member states as additional funds for Lebanon, Jordan and Syria;
- €1 billion to be added to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, consisting of €0.5 billion from the European Development Fund (EDF) reserve and €0.5 billion from member states; and
- Macro-financial assistance to avoid economic instability of up to €1 billion in loans to Tunisia (€0.3 billion being implemented and €0.5 billion proposed by the Commission in February 2016) and Jordan (€0.2 billion under consideration).

In the long term, the same announcement also proposed an ambitious External Investment Plan, building on the experience of the successful Investment Plan for Europe, which could unlock €31 billion in investments. Further still, it has the potential to reach €62 billion in public and private investments in the real economy, if member states and other partners match the EU budget contribution. While there is good reason to be sceptical about these figures, given a history of EU member states failing to fulfil pledged commitments, such astronomical targets illustrate the high price Europe is willing to pay to reduce flows of refugees and migrants into the continent.

Since December 2014, total expenditure outside Europe, including the EU–Turkey deal and two targeted trust funds, comes to €15.3 billion. This does not include the tens of billions of euros which could potentially be unlocked by the External Investment Fund.

4.3. Do these investments reduce flows?

While it is clear that internal and externalised border controls are not cheap, our analysis of migration trends shows that they can be effective in reducing flows, at least on the national level. In numerous cases, most recently through the EU–Turkey deal, data shows that controlling a specific border can lead to a significant reduction of flows through that border.

However, this is not the whole picture. Rather than deterring or preventing refugees and migrants from entering Europe, our analysis suggests that border controls simply reroute them towards alternative, often more dangerous and covert routes. The number of new asylum applications is almost as high as it was in 2015, with approximately 890,000 asylum applications expected in 2016. Moreover, there is a significant chance that in the long term, border controls instituted by Europe could end up increasing flows, as a consequence of the effect of these policies in poor countries which are hosting the majority of the world's refugees (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016).

Meanwhile (as discussed in Section 2), there is little evidence to show that measures targeting the root causes of mobility have any effect in reducing migration flows. To the contrary, it is likely that mobility will increase in line with development.

5. Policy response: the costs of hosting

5.1. Asylum applications

Once refugees and migrants reach the shores of Europe, they can claim asylum. Under the Dublin Regulations, the country in which the asylum seeker first applies for asylum is responsible for either accepting or rejecting asylum. Asylum seekers may not restart the process in another jurisdiction.


Asylum applications in Europe displayed a slow upward trend between 2008 and 2012, and accelerated upwards from 2013. In October 2015, the number of monthly applications peaked at 180,000. 2016 will see approximately 890,000 new asylum applications. This number does not include the half a million asylum applicants in Germany from 2015 who have not yet been formally registered.

However, there is a large variation in the numbers of refugees and migrants applying for asylum in the selected

European countries. As shown in Figure 20, in 2015, Germany received by far the largest number of asylum applications at 57.9%.


Processing asylum applications can take a significant amount of time. The ratio between the number of pending applications and the number of applications resolved in a month (by decision or withdrawal) varied between 8.3 and 15.3 (see Figure 22). This can be taken as a proxy for the likely number of months needed to resolve asylum applications. In fact, this average obscures the differences between individual asylum applications. Many have to wait years for decisions on their asylum application. Slow asylum decision processes lead not only to increased maintenance costs, but also encourage the ineligible to apply for asylum as they can establish themselves in the informal economy while waiting for a decision..

Figure 20: New asylum applications in the EU and EFTA between January 2008-June 2016



Sources: Eurostat tables *migr_asyappctzm* and *migr_asypenctzm*


Figure 21: Flows of asylum seekers to Europe in 2015 showing the percentage of the total caseload



Source: Eurostat.

Note: Large 'unknown' flow to Germany represents nationalities other than the top 10 recorded on the EASY-system. Figures have been adjusted for over-counting in Hungary and under-counting in Germany.

Figure 22: Expected average time to process caseload, 2014-2016



Source: Eurostat (Tables: migr_asyappctzm, migr_asydcfstq and migr_asywithm)

Note: Figures are expressed as the average pending caseload at the end of each month divided by the average number of applications resolved per month.


5.2. Asylum decisions

When processing an asylum claim, a host country can choose to approve or reject it. However, our analysis on asylum application decisions by nationality of origin and country of application, suggests significant inconsistency in processing approaches across Europe. This inconsistency is highlighted by the huge range of positive first-instance asylum decisions across Europe, and the lack of consistency on the basis on which asylum is granted. As shown in Figures 24-28, the variation exists even from applicants from a single country. The lack of uniformity is not a new issue – it was highlighted by UNHCR in their commentary on the EU Qualification Directive on Protection (UNHCR, 2009) and in comparative studies of protection in member states (UNHCR, 2007; ELENA, 2008).

The rate of positive asylum decisions across Europe has effectively doubled from approximately 30% in 2006 to 60% in 2016. The reason for the rise in approval is largely down to the Syrian impact: as Figure 24 shows, nearly all applications for asylum by Syrian nationals are approved with positive decisions reaching 98% in the third quarter of 2015. For other countries also affected by conflict, such as Afghanistan and Somalia, the picture is much more mixed.


Syria: Even for asylum applicants from Syria, the likelihood of a successful asylum application depends on where it is made. Figure 25 shows that while nearly 100% of Syrian asylum applications were granted in the first instance in most European countries from mid-2015 to

Figure 23: Rate of positive asylum decisions for applicants from all countries, July 2015-June 2016



Source: Eurostat migr_asydcfstq

Figure 24: Rate of positive asylum decisions by origin country, July 2015-June 2016



Source: Eurostat.

mid-2016, the rate of approval was significantly lower in Hungary.


Eritrea: Similarly, while seven European countries granted asylum to all Eritreans, in the UK, only half of applications were approved (see Figure 26). This is despite the UN’s Commission on Human Rights in Eritrea finding that ‘systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed in Eritrea under the authority of the Government’ (Eritrea Commission, 2015) and no improvement was noted in 2016 (Eritrea Commission, 2016). In the first quarter of 2016, 89% of appeals by Eritreans against negative asylum decisions in the UK were granted. This led UK MPs to suggest that the government suspend making decisions on Eritrean asylum

applicants until the advice to officials had been updated (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2016).

Afghanistan and Somalia: The differences are even greater in the case of Afghanistan and Somalia: from mid-2015 to mid-2016 over 95% of applicants from Afghanistan were granted asylum in Italy, whereas less than 25% of cases were approved in Denmark (Figure 27). In the case of Somalia, the average success rate across the EU is approximately 60%, with Finland and Italy approving over 90% of the cases, and France only 26% (Figure 28).


An analysis of asylum applications by gender also reveals a trend: until mid-2014, asylum applications by women were more likely to be successful than applications from men. However, since the third quarter of 2014, men

Figure 25: Rate of positive asylum decisions for Syrian asylum seekers by country of application (states without applicants from Syria excluded), July 2015-June 2016




Source: Eurostat migr_asydcfstq

Figure 26: Rate of positive asylum decisions for Eritrean asylum seekers by country of application (states without applicants from Eritrea excluded), July 2015-June 2016




Source: Eurostat migr_asydcfstq

Figure 27: Rate of positive asylum decisions for Afghani asylum seekers by country of application (states without applicants from Afghanistan excluded), July 2015-June 2016



Source: Eurostat migr_asydcfstq

Figure 28: Rate of positive asylum decisions for Somali asylum seekers by country of application (states without applicants from Somalia excluded), July 2015-June 2016



Source: Eurostat migr_asydcfstq


became more likely to have their asylum applications approved than women. This seems to be the impact of the large number of asylum requests in Germany, where men are more likely to have an asylum request granted than women. Women are still more likely to be granted asylum than men in 21 of the 32 EU and EFTA countries. As a general rule, women are more likely to be granted asylum than men in Eastern and Southern Europe.

Further analysis is needed to better understand what explains these variations. Yet one thing is clear: despite the common European policy framework (European

Parliament and Council, 2011) and the universal principles established in the 1951 Convention, European migrant and asylum policy is not coordinated. The variation in the approval rates between European countries suggests that assessments are being made on some bureaucratic bases without full consideration of the risks facing asylum seekers in their countries of origin. The variation is even more extreme when we consider not only whether asylum is granted or not, but on the basis on which asylum is granted.²²

22. In Europe, asylum seekers may be granted asylum on the basis that: 1) they meet the Geneva Convention definition of a refugee; 2) they would face a real risk of serious harm if they returned to their own country; 3) they meet the terms of subsidiary protection as specified in the EU's so-called 'qualifying directive'; and 4) on compassionate or humanitarian grounds (humanitarian protection is not defined or given as a basis for protection in the EU directive).

Figure 29: Comparison of male and female asylum application success rates by country of asylum for all countries, July 2015–June 2016



Source: Eurostat.

Note: The countries on the left approved proportionately more asylum applications from males, and those on right approved more from females.

Furthermore, short term and ad-hoc policy responses targeting specific countries of origin, like the many pledges and commitments to ‘welcome’ Syrian refugees, are unlikely to address the multiple realities and drivers of migration from different countries. A more coordinated and consistent approach would help Europe better manage flows of refugees and migrants.

5.3. The costs of receiving and maintaining asylum seekers

Given the vast numbers of asylum seekers detailed above, the costs incurred by national governments in both emergency needs provision and the processing of asylum claims at arrival (reception and procedural costs) are considerable. Countries have, for the most part, effectively and quickly mobilised the necessary resources to resettle and host refugees. Germany for example, has made a large investment to process asylum claims more quickly (Bowlby, 2016). However, there is – once again – great variations between European countries.

Comparing the costs of refugee processing and support across Europe is therefore no easy task. A recent study (Massa, 2016) reveals that there is no harmonised way in which governments report the expenditures incurred for actions related to asylum seekers such as reception, sustenance, assistance, resettlement, integration and repatriation. In many countries, different government departments, as well as different levels of government, are responsible for refugee-related costs, making overall figures difficult to calculate, even for the country concerned.

The experience of the OECD estimating in-donor country costs for refugees illustrates the outcomes of these problems. Under the present OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) rules, in-donor country expenditures on refugees are regarded as Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the first year (DAC Secretariat, 2016). DAC countries report their total spending on in-donor country refugees as well as the cost per capita. The OECD/DAC recognises that the current system of reporting in-donor costs is neither consistent, comparable, nor transparent (OECD/DAC, 2016a) and therefore attempted to seek agreement on reform from members at February 2016’s high level meeting. Unfortunately, agreement could not be reached and reform has been pushed back to at least 2017 (Barbière, 2016).

The huge variation in methodology between countries also produces very different estimates. For example, according to the data supplied by the UK to the OECD/DAC, in-donor costs for refugees hosted in the UK are €3,000²³ a year (DAC Secretariat, 2016). The UK Home Office estimated that an adult refugee on benefits costs from €14,763 to €32,252 a year (Dedman, 2016). However, this estimate ignores the initial selection and processing cost, the costs of language training or other integration measures.

Table 3 compares the estimates of the per capita costs of hosting asylum seekers and refugees. The OECD estimate is from the occasional surveys of DAC member spending on refugees and asylum seekers. The arrival year and ongoing cost estimates are based on work by Massa (2016) and ODI (2016b). The annual cost shows the estimated per capita refugee costs published by Berger and Heinemann

23. All conversions are using the 2015 OECD exchange rate.

(2016). The ‘at risk of poverty’ level highlights the threshold at which a single adult in 2014 would be at risk of poverty. This is included in the table as a reality check on the various estimates. Estimates that are far above this level would suggest a very generous approach to refugees and asylum seekers. Levels far below would suggest an unsustainable system.

Only Massa (ODI, 2016b) makes a distinction between initial reception and longer-term resettlement costs. Berger and Heinemann (2016) estimate costs which are 1.8 times the 2014 ‘at risk of poverty’ level. This seems high. Massa’s (2016) arrival costs, which are lower, are based on bottom-up calculations of the published costs of the services provided to asylum seekers and are therefore more robust.

Table 3: Estimates of the per capita costs in the EU and EFTA for hosting, compared with poverty levels in the considered countries (euros)

Country	OECD DAC costs	Reception and procedural costs	Resettlement costs in 2015	Annual cost in 2015	‘At risk of poverty’ level 2014
Norway	12,559	13,283	20,180		26,265
Switzerland	20,404				22,897
Luxembourg				49,767	20,592
Denmark	19,655	14,574	15,240	27,151	16,717
Sweden	12,535	15,641	13,720	25,814	16,272
Finland	16,642			21,977	14,221
Austria	4,156	15,620	11,558	22,674	13,926
Iceland	21,371				13,492
Belgium	23,033	12,582	10,687	21,337	13,023
France	10,995	12,567	10,872	19,128	12,719
Netherlands	28,804	13,523	12,250	22,791	12,535
United Kingdom	2,941	23,133	9,073	22,907	12,350
Germany	8,035	14,578	10,084	21,163	11,840
Ireland				24,535	11,686
Italy	15,289	20,166	8,084	15,581	9,455
Cyprus				11,744	8,640
Spain	12,346	9,030	5,656	13,663	7,961
Malta				11,337	7,672
Slovenia				10,756	7,146
Portugal	1,626			10,000	4,937
Greece		7,281	5,947	9,419	4,608
Czech Republic				8,953	4,573
Estonia				9,012	4,330
Slovakia				8,314	4,086
Poland	4,759			6,686	3,202
Croatia				5,988	3,135
Latvia				7,326	3,122
Lithuania				7,558	2,894
Hungary	6,617	4,056	2,162	6,628	2,707
Bulgaria				3,430	1,987
Romania				4,593	1,317

Sources: Massa (2016), ODI (2016b), OECD/DAC (2016), Eurostat (table: ilc_li01 – single person, Euro), Berger and Heinemann (2016). OECD/DAC costs are mainly from 2015, but some are from 2009.

Box 7: Estimating the costs

There are three main types of costs associated with receiving and processing asylum claims: financial allowances, procedural costs and healthcare and education costs. Annex A summarises the actual costs across these categories for a selection of European countries.

In hosting economies, asylum seekers are either entitled to be fed and housed directly or through financial allowances and/or vouchers.²⁴ These are designed to allow refugees to cover basic needs such as food, clothes, accommodation and in some cases, recreation activities. Allowances may be paid in cash or in-kind through vouchers that can be exchanged for food and other basic needs. The type of allowance varies from country to country depending on the type of accommodation where the refugee has been placed and according to their household composition.

In addition, national governments incur a number of procedural costs related to application assessment such as translation and legal aid. These are often underestimated and under-reported, even though they can amount to approximately 20% of the total costs of receiving and processing applications (Berger and Heinemann, 2016). Finally, most European countries provide refugees with access to healthcare and education – again, an additional cost.

Massa calculated the reception and procedural costs in 13 European countries (2016), and the annual resettlement cost in 2015 (ODI 2016b). We have assumed that the costs in 2016 are similar and have used Massa's work to estimate the initial cost for new arrivals for the first 12 months, and the ongoing support costs for those already in Europe.

Massa's resettlement costs are slightly below the poverty level (96% on average). These are very conservative costs. This is the 'at risk of poverty' level for a single person: the per capita costs would be lower for families. Where state provision falls short, charities may be required to fill the gap.

We tested the different cost estimates by comparing them with published costs from governments. For example, the UK government has budgeted €811 million for receiving 20,000 Syrian refugees from 2016-2021. This is intended to be the full cost for all services, including those provided by local authorities, for several years of support (BBC News, 2016b). This works out at €40,556 per capita, far below the Berger and Heinemann estimate of €68,721 (for three years of support). To compare, using Massa's costs for the arrival year (Massa 2016) and two

maintenance years (ODI, 2016b) is €41,278, a reasonable approximation of the budget cost.

Take the case of Sweden, which is currently supporting 180,000 asylum seekers who arrived in 2015, and is expected to receive between 70,000-140,000 more in 2016. Using Berger and Heinemann, the costs of receiving and maintaining these refugees would come to 39.3 billion SEK (€4.1 billion), even without any additional asylum seekers in 2016. Using Massa's (2016; ODI, 2016b) figures for 180,000 maintenance cases plus an additional 140,000 new arrivals, gives a total cost of 39.3 billion SEK (€4.1 billion) – slightly short of the 40.9 billion SEK (€4.3 billion) that the Swedish migration agency has asked for (The Local, 2016b). Therefore, it would appear that Sweden has effectively budgeted for their expected asylum seekers.

Massa (2016; ODI, 2016b) provided estimates for 13 European countries. These were the main countries of interest representing 93% of the caseload in 2015 and 91% in 2016. However, we wanted to estimate costs in all 32 EU and EFTA countries (including the UK). For both the maintenance and the initial costs, we fitted a trend-line to a graph of the cost estimates from Massa (2016) against the 'at risk of poverty' threshold published by Eurostat. We then used the relationship between Massa's data and the 'at risk of poverty' threshold to estimate the initial and maintenance costs for the remaining countries.

Table 4 shows us that the European cost burden is clearly significant: new asylum applications in 2016 will cost the EU and EFTA €9.24 billion. Germany is going to bear the largest cost, with Italy second and the UK third.

In addition, European countries will still be bearing costs from arrivals in 2015, particularly regarding the backlog of asylum claims still to be processed. Table 5 shows the cost of maintaining the 2015 caseload throughout 2016. Again, a number of assumptions are made:

- Backlog of 520,000 unregistered asylum seekers are added to the German total (subtracted from new asylum claims in 2016);
- Some 117,750 asylum claimants were subtracted from the total for Hungary;
- The 2015 costs are little changed in 2016.
- Those granted asylum in 2015 are still dependent on assistance in 2016;
- Costs for detaining or deporting failed asylum seekers are ignored;
- The costs of pre-2015 caseload are ignored; and
- Any savings from withdrawals of asylum applications in 2016 are also ignored (other than withdrawals in Hungary in January 2016).

24. This also applies to failed asylum seekers waiting for deportation.

Box 8: Methodology and methods

We then used the estimates of arrival year and subsequent year costs to generate estimates of the total costs for 2016 on the following basis.

- 1. Arrival year costs:** Based on Massa's calculations of the reception and processing costs for 13 countries and on the relationship to the 2014 poverty level in the country concerned (from trend-line fitting). We did not apply the full reception and processing cost as this included support for 12 months. Calculations showed us that given the average length of stay of seven months, and the additional fixed costs in the first year, the average first year cost in 2016 would be 73% of the cost for a full first year. We therefore used this factor for the 2016 costs.
- 2. After the first year costs:** Based on Massa's calculations for the settlement cost for 13 countries and on the relationship to the 2014 poverty level in the country concerned found from trend-line fitting.
- 3. Numbers from 2015:** These were the Eurostat numbers adjusted for under-counting in Germany and over-counting in Hungary.
- 4. Asylum applications in 2016:** We assumed that the trends seen in the second quarter of 2016 would continue. We analysed the seasonality of migration from 2009 to 2014 (to exclude the atypical flows in 2015) after subtracting recorded arrivals on the Eastern Mediterranean route (as this is highly seasonal, but is now effectively shut). We established the average ratio between asylum claims in the second half of each year and the number of claims in the second quarter. For every country but Germany, we added the number of asylum seekers in the second six months to the estimate for the second six months of 2016 (based on the seasonality ratio applied to the application in the first quarter. We did the same for Germany, but used the EASY-registration data instead. Implicit in this assumption is that there are no major changes to the flow of refugees and migrants to Europe.

Table 4: Costs of receiving new asylum applications in 2016

	New asylum applicants in 2016	Full annual first year costs	73% of first year costs	Total cost (€, millions)
EU 28	856,759			8,748
Germany	339,286	14,578	10,642	3,611
Italy	114,553	20,166	14,721	1,686
United Kingdom	43,381	23,133	16,887	733
France	78,767	12,567	9,174	723
Austria	50,708	15,620	11,403	578
Switzerland	27,104	22,854	16,684	452
Sweden	22,897	15,641	11,418	261
Greece	46,161	7,281	5,315	245
Hungary	57,690	4,056	2,961	171
Netherlands	15,482	13,523	9,872	153
Belgium	13,705	12,582	9,185	126
Spain	16,443	9,030	6,592	108
Denmark	7,145	14,574	10,639	76
Finland	5,589	16,081	11,739	66
Poland	15,459	5,351	3,906	60
Bulgaria	16,024	3,763	2,747	44
Norway	3,153	13,283	9,697	31
Luxembourg	1,898	21,133	15,427	29
Ireland	2,075	13,912	10,156	21
Cyprus	2,445	11,133	8,127	20
Malta	1,698	10,198	7,444	13
Czech Republic	1,315	6,961	5,082	7
Iceland	585	15,468	11,292	7
Slovenia	877	9,677	7,064	6
Portugal	691	7,366	5,377	4
Croatia	728	5,268	3,846	3
Romania	948	2,778	2,028	2
Latvia	342	5,252	3,834	1
Lithuania	279	4,966	3,625	1
Estonia	124	6,686	4,881	1
Slovakia	49	6,406	4,676	0
EU 28 & EFTA	887,601			9,238

Sources: Eurostat, Massa, BMI, PBP and Preuss.

The large number of asylum applicants from 2015 (1.7 million) will cost €18 billion in maintenance costs in 2016. Table 6 summarises the costs in 2016 for supporting both those who arrived in 2015 and new arrivals in 2016. It also presents the overall cost as:

- A percentage of the 2015 GDP for that country (Eurostat)
- The total caseload as a percentage of the 2015 population of that country (World Bank population data)
- The average cost per person for supporting the asylum seekers in 2016 (using World Bank population data for 2015).

The cost burden is significant. The total 2015 and 2016 asylum caseload will cost €27.3 billion in 2016. While this looks like a large amount of money, it is only about €1 per week per person across the EU and EFTA (€52.14 per person for the year).

However, this burden is not shared equally among European nations. In terms of GDP, Sweden will bear the heaviest cost, with 2016 costs expected to amount to 0.54% of 2015 GDP. Germany (0.46%) and Austria (0.44%) also bear high costs. After Germany, France and the UK are the two largest economies in the EU, but their cost only represents 0.07% and 0.04% of GDP respectively.

In terms of the population load, the burden is not equally shared. Again, Sweden (1.83% of the 2015 population), Germany (1.60%) and Austria (1.58%) lead. France and the UK only have asylum seekers equivalent to 0.22% and 0.13% of their respective 2015 populations.

In terms of euros per person, Sweden (€245.27 in 2016 costs per head of population in 2015), Austria (€181.91) and Germany (€163.48) are again taking the heaviest burden, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg and the other Nordic countries.

In terms of small states, Malta is bearing a significant cost: 0.28% of GDP at a cost of €56.36 per head. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that those nations that have faced lower burdens will share the cost. It is notable that even at the simplest level of burden-sharing – that of taking excess refugees from Italy and Greece – some countries still refuse to accept any such transfers (Mueller and Evans, 2016).

Table 5: Cost of the 2015 caseload in 2016

	2015 asylum applicants and intending applicants	Annual per-capita support cost (€)	Total 2016 cost for 2015 caseload (€, millions)
EU 28	1,657,920		16,737
Germany	961,800	10,084	9,699
Sweden	156,120	13,720	2,142
Austria	85,500	11,558	988
France	70,565	10,872	767
Switzerland	38,060	18,481	703
Italy	83,240	8,084	673
Norway	30,460	20,180	615
Netherlands	43,035	12,250	527
Belgium	38,995	10,687	417
Finland	32,150	11,861	381
United Kingdom	38,370	9,073	348
Denmark	20,825	15,240	317
Hungary	56,675	2,162	123
Spain	14,595	5,656	83
Greece	11,360	5,947	68
Bulgaria	20,170	2,526	51
Luxembourg	2,365	16,722	40
Poland	10,255	3,454	35
Ireland	3,270	9,927	32
Cyprus	2,105	7,603	16
Malta	1,700	6,864	12
Czech Republic	1,230	4,500	6
Portugal	875	4,777	4
Iceland	265	11,305	3
Romania	1,220	2,015	2
Slovenia	255	6,463	2
Slovakia	275	4,128	1
Latvia	330	3,392	1
Estonia	230	4,314	1
Lithuania	270	3,219	1
Croatia	140	3,402	0
EU+EFTA	1,726,705		18,058

Sources: Eurostat, Massa (2016b), BMI, PBP and Preuss.

Table 6: Summary costs for the 2015 and 2016 caseload in 2016

	2015 Caseload	New asylum seekers in 2016	Total caseload by end of 2016	Total costs in 2016 (€ bn)	As a percentage of 2015 GDP	Asylum seekers as % of 2015 population	2016 asylum costs per capita of 2015 population (€, millions)
EU 28	1,657,920	856,759	2,514,679	25,485	0.17%	0.49%	50.00
Sweden	156,120	22,897	179,017	2,403	0.54%	1.83%	245.27
Austria	85,500	50,708	136,208	1,566	0.46%	1.58%	181.91
Germany	961,800	339,286	1,301,086	13,309	0.44%	1.60%	163.48
Switzerland	38,060	27,104	65,164	1,156	0.19%	0.79%	139.45
Norway	30,460	3,153	33,613	645	0.18%	0.65%	124.19
Luxembourg	2,365	1,898	4,263	69	0.13%	0.75%	120.82
Finland	32,150	5,589	37,739	447	0.21%	0.69%	81.53
Denmark	20,825	7,145	27,970	393	0.15%	0.49%	69.31
Malta	1,700	1,698	3,398	24	0.28%	0.79%	56.36
Belgium	38,995	13,705	52,700	543	0.13%	0.47%	48.08
Netherlands	43,035	15,482	58,517	680	0.10%	0.35%	40.15
Italy	83,240	114,553	197,793	2,359	0.14%	0.33%	38.80
Cyprus	2,105	2,445	4,550	36	0.21%	0.39%	30.79
Hungary	56,675	57,690	114,365	293	0.27%	1.16%	29.80
Iceland	265	585	850	10	0.06%	0.26%	29.02
Greece	11,360	46,161	57,521	313	0.18%	0.53%	28.91
France	70,565	78,767	149,332	1,490	0.07%	0.22%	22.30
United Kingdom	38,370	43,381	81,751	1,081	0.04%	0.13%	16.59
Bulgaria	20,170	16,024	36,194	95	0.22%	0.50%	13.23
Ireland	3,270	2,075	5,345	54	0.02%	0.12%	11.54
Spain	14,595	16,443	31,038	191	0.02%	0.07%	4.11
Slovenia	255	877	1,132	8	0.02%	0.05%	3.80
Poland	10,255	15,459	25,714	96	0.02%	0.07%	2.52
Latvia	330	342	672	2	0.01%	0.03%	1.23
Estonia	230	124	354	2	0.01%	0.03%	1.22
Czech Republic	1,230	1,315	2,545	12	0.01%	0.02%	1.16
Croatia	140	728	868	3	0.01%	0.02%	0.78
Portugal	875	691	1,566	8	0.00%	0.02%	0.76
Lithuania	270	279	549	2	0.01%	0.02%	0.65
Slovakia	275	49	324	1	0.00%	0.01%	0.25
Romania	1,220	948	2,168	4	0.00%	0.01%	0.22
EU+EFTA	1,726,705	887,601	2,614,306	27,296	0.17%	0.50%	52.14

Sources: Eurostat, Massa (2016a, 2016b), BMI, World Bank, PBP and Preuss.

6. Conclusion

The world is likely to continue to see increased numbers of people on the move. Short-term and ad-hoc responses are unlikely to be effective and can be expensive. This is a concerning trend, given both the human and financial costs involved in this process. As one country constructs fences and institutes strong controls on its borders, there is a deep incentive for neighbouring countries to follow suit, or risk migration flows being redirected to their own borders. As such, as flows into Europe increased in 2015, we have seen a costly ‘domino effect’, whereby money spent on border control in one country has created a more urgent need for surrounding countries to also increase costs. Thus, when on 28 October 2015 Austria announced it was building a fence on its border with Slovenia, just weeks later Slovenia announced it was building a fence on its border with Croatia (Wall Street Journal, 2015). Millions of euros are poured into shifting burdens across individual countries in Europe, with little progress made on actually reducing the numbers arriving as a whole.

Moreover, research suggests that in the long term, border fortification may even have the potential of increasing flows arriving in Europe. It is likely that Europe’s high profile border fortification has sent a signal that obligations under the Refugee Convention are negotiable (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016). In May 2016, Kenya announced the planned closure of Dadaab Camp (which houses over 300,000 refugees) on the grounds of security, with the government stating that in putting security first it ‘will not be the first to do so: this is the standard practice worldwide. For example, in Europe, rich, prosperous, and democratic countries are turning away refugees from Syria, one of the worst warzones since World War Two’ (The Government of Kenya, 2016). While at the time of writing, it looks as if the Kenyan government may have softened its stance on the closure (International Business Times, 2016), in Kenya, and in other refugee hosting countries worldwide, there is a very real risk that, should refugees become increasingly unable to find protection in neighbouring countries, at least some of them will instead try to make their way to Europe (World Vision, 2016).

One possible solution is to use aid to reduce migration by addressing its root causes. The Trust Funds described in Section 4.2.2. are ambitious in their scope and cost, but will they actually achieve their intended purpose of

decreasing migration flows? Given the recent nature of these deals, it is probably too soon to tell. But there is no evidence of a link between aid and reduced migration. In fact, if anything, the opposite is true, at least in the short term and for poor countries. As incomes rise, aspirations rise, and transport costs fall, more people choose to migrate to seek a ‘better life’ (Haas, 2007).

Yet the complexity of the relationship between aid and migration does not stop there. Imposing conditionality on international aid when it is in response to highly political issues, like migration, also has a very poor track record. On the humanitarian side, money is often pledged but not delivered.²⁵ The risk here is twofold: aid will, yet again, fail to deliver and it will be harder to argue for in the future, while migration numbers will remain unaffected.

6.1. Policy recommendations

Without international and regional cooperation, investing in isolated border controls and security is a bottomless pit. Refugees and migrants will go through new borders in neighbouring countries. In turn, these countries will also spend more on similar border controls and security, resulting in a ‘domino effect’. The inconsistent and short-term nature of the European response to this ‘crisis’ may also have wider ripple effects – encouraging other countries to put up borders and force refugees and migrants out (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016).

There is no doubt that, on matters of migration, sovereign states will continue to be the key actors and decision-makers. However, a new form of international and multilateral action is needed. This action is important, not only in bolstering the vital principles of solidarity and shared responsibility, but also for equally vital pragmatic reasons. Individual countries cannot address, and effectively manage, migration – they risk spending significant amounts of money trying, and failing.

Whether this new, pragmatic model of global governance for managing flows of refugees and migrants can be achieved through old means and institutions – like the UN, international agreements, etc. – and sealed at global summits is an increasingly urgent question. The private sector is a growing and dynamic actor on migration matters – after all, they too have much to lose from overly restrictive policies. Regional institutions and coalitions will

25. For example, Oxfam reported that only one third of the \$9 billion pledged after Hurricane Mitch was ever delivered (Oxfam International, 2005).

also continue to have a major role. However, no progress will be made until the public, especially in transit and host countries, become more accurately informed about, and constructively engaged in, migration debates. There is an important objective in sharing accurate information with the public to reassure citizens in destination countries that human mobility can, and should be better managed to benefit all. This involves the following:

1. European governments should facilitate and increase legal pathways so that they can monitor, and more effectively manage flows of refugees and migrants.

This report demonstrates that restrictive policies and tightened borders can result in more covert migration. This will make it harder, not easier, for governments to monitor migration and design suitable policies to manage it. Legal migration pathways will help governments predict flows, make pragmatic decisions about quotas, skills gaps, hosting costs and enhance the benefits to the economy. These pathways can be tailored to different countries (depending on labour market needs, skills gaps, etc.) and sit alongside the global asylum system that continues to guarantee protection for vulnerable refugees.

2. A new global alliance of migration and displacement data is needed. This should be a collaborative effort between governments, specialised agencies (such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)) the private sector and international

organisations. It should be aimed, in the first instance, at harmonising reporting and increasing the frequency of data from both traditional and non-traditional sources to build a more coherent and comprehensive picture of human mobility. In Europe, there is an urgent need to move away from focusing solely on new arrivals and instead to cross-check data on deaths, asylum processes and outcomes to build a much more accurate picture of both overt and covert flows.

3. Governments should commit to more transparency on deterrence costs, as well as the significant reception and procedural costs in both national and EU budgets.

Both national and EU parliaments must be given the ability to scrutinise these costs – to analyse whether these investments work and to deliver results. This transparency needs to extend to the wider public. The media tends to focus solely on arrivals data, and individual case studies, without looking at the broader facts and figures. If there was more dissemination of these costs, it would help inform a balanced and evidence-based public debate.

4. Forge new international and regional coalitions built around common interests and objectives that aim to ensure safe, controlled and well-managed migration.

This cannot be achieved by the UN alone, or through traditional multilateralism – the political stakes of sovereign states are too high. The private sector has a key role and should be involved in the development and implementation of such coalitions.

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Country	Breakdown costs per refugee (monthly, €)												
	Board / lodging	Allowance in reception centre including food	Allowance in reception centre without food	Allowance in private accommodation	Clothes	Education	Pocket money	Recreation activity	Food	Health	Pre-primary education	Primary education	Secondary education
Spain										117.48	560.45	607.30	801.22
Single adult		347.60											
Household 2 persons		520.73											
Household 3 persons		557.73											
Household 4 persons		594.73											
Household 5 or more persons		792.73											
UK										210.58			
Adults with benefits (not able to work)		2,281.00				0.00							
Adults without benefits (able to work)		916.00				0.00							
Children below 3 years		916.00				0.00							
Children 3- 4 years		916.00				242.56							
Children 5-18 years		916.00				483.83							

Source: Author's figures based on various sources as outlined in sub-section 3.1.

Note: * The monthly board/lodging cost items for Greece and Hungary are computed as the sum of the monthly housing and material reception conditions cost items estimated on the basis of data provided by Berger and Heinemann (2016).

This work was funded by:



This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies.



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